When making decisions, humans are often distracted by irrelevant information. Distraction has 20 different impact on perceptual, cognitive and value-guided choices, giving rise to well-described 21 behavioural phenomena such as the tilt illusion, conflict adaptation, or economic decoy effects. 22
Introduction
Decisions about sensory signals, cognitive propositions, or economic prospects are often made in 35 the context of competing or distracting information. Consider the following everyday situations: 36 you are judging whether a painting hangs straight on the wall, but the nearby pictures are hung 37 askew; you are waiting at a red stop signal, but the car in front decides to jump the light; you are 38 contemplating the purchase of a new watch, but it is displayed next to a range of more elegant but 39 unaffordable models. In each of these situations, the best decisions will be made by ignoring the 40 distracting sensory signals (the competing picture frames, vehicles, or watches) and focussing 41 exclusively on the choice-relevant information. This normative contention can be formalised in a 42 variety of ways, for example via the notion that rational choices should be independent of 43 irrelevant alternatives 1, 2 or that sensory signals should be weighted lawfully by their reliability and 44 relevance to the choice at hand 3-6 . 45 by distracting information. Consider a generic problem in which a target stimulus and 48 distracters occur at fixed locations i and j. In this general formulation, decision values X may be 49 perceptual features (such as the tilt of a grating) or economic attributes (such as the quality of a 50 consumer product) that are to be evaluated or categorised. Humans show systematic biases that 51 reflect the influence of the distracters on decisions about the target. For example, vision scientists 52 have long studied the "tilt illusion", in which the reported orientation of (e.g. a central grating) 53 is repulsed away from the mean tilt of (surrounding gratings with similar but nonidentical tilt; 54 Fig. 1a ) 7 . In cognitive psychology, the influence of distracter items is usually studied with a view to 55 understanding the attentional or control mechanisms that allow information to be selected in the 56 face of conflict. For example, in the classic Eriksen flanker task, observers classify a target stimulus 57 (e.g. a central arrow) that is flanked by distracters (e.g. arrows pointing in compatible or 58 incompatible directions) 8, 9 . It is ubiquitously observed that incompatible flankers incur a cost, and 59 compatible flankers a benefit, in response times (RTs) and accuracy relative to a neutral condition 60 ( Fig. 1b) . Finally, behavioural and neural economists have charted the irrational influence that a 61 decoy alternative of value has on choices between two choice-relevant prospects + and − , 62
where + > −10-13 . A common finding is that rational choices (i.e. for + > − ) initially decline 63 as increases in value, but then increase sharply as comes to approximately match the other 64 5 Right panel: simulation of the adaptive gain model recreates the tilt illusion and further predicts that the magnitude of the bias is modulated by flanker variance; coloured lines reflect flanker standard deviation from low (red) to high (blue). (B) Left panel: In the Eriksen flanker task, participants respond with a key press to a central letter while ignoring the flankers. Middle panel: response times are the fastest on CO ('congruent') trials, then the SI ('Stimulus Incongruent') trials, and slowest on RI ('Response incongruent') trials; Middle panel; adapted from van Veen & Carter, 2002, permission pending). See methods for details of how CO, RI and SI trials were defined. Right panel: the adaptive gain model predicts the same pattern of reaction time across the three conditions. (C) Left panel: participants chose the most preferred of three food items. Middle panel: increasing the value of the least-preferred item reduces the choice efficiency (i.e. probability of choosing the highest-valued target) as the normalised distractor value increases, shown by logistic slope from fitting logistic choice functions on humans choice. Using the adaptive gain model, we simulated the subjective difference between two tilts (blue and red line) as a function of a third distracting tilt (x-axis). The subjective difference is first reduced and the increased in a qualitatively similar fashion.
In the fields of psychology, economics, and neuroscience, diverse theoretical proposals have been 68 offered to explain the cost that distracters incur during decision-making. These include models 69 that describe how control systems detect and resolve conflict among inputs 14, 15 , accounts that 70 emphasise inhibitory interactions among competing sensory neurons, or favour a normalisation of 71 stimulus values by a local average or range 10,16-18 , and Bayesian accounts that model spatial 72 uncertainty among targets and distracters 19-21 , or that assume strong priors on the compatibility of 73 decision information 21 . These accounts disagree about the computational mechanisms involved, 74 the neural processing stages at which the cost of distraction arises, and about the brain structures 75 that are recruited to protect decisions against irrelevant information. For example, divisive 76 normalisation mechanisms may occur in sensory neurons in visual cortex 16 , or amongst value 77 representations in the orbitofrontal cortex 22 , whereas the control systems that detect and resolve 78
conflict have been attributed to medial and lateral prefrontal structures 14 . As such, the field 79 currently lacks a single, unified theory that can account for the effect of distraction on human 80 decisions, or an integrated neural account of its implementation across perceptual, cognitive and 81 economic domains. 82
83
The goal of the current paper is to offer such an account. We begin with a simple computational 84 model that is motivated by past work showing that contextual signals determine the gain of 85 processing of consistent (or "expected") features during decision-making tasks 23 . Our model, 86
which is described here at the level of neural population codes, proposes that contextual signals 87 sharpen the tuning curves of neurons with compatible preference for decision-relevant features, 88 and is motivated by a large literature emphasising the need for adaptive gain control in the service 89 of efficient coding 24,25 . Using computational simulations, we first show that the model can 90 recreate qualitatively two classic phenomena in very different domains -perceptual choice (the 7 tilt illusion) and economic choice (decoy effects). Next, we turn our attention to a task that has 92 been a mainstay of cognitive studies of distraction -the Eriksen Flanker task. We built novel 93 variants of the task in which the statistics of the flankers, and the difference between target and 94 the decision bound can vary across conditions. Our simulations show that the model predicts a 95 range of striking, counterintuitive behavioural findings, including "reverse" compatibility effects 96 (where fully-visible, compatible flankers actually hinder, rather than help, behavioural 97 performance). Over 4 behavioural experiments involving human participants, we validate these 98 predictions, using visual stimuli defined by both tilt and colour. Finally, we use functional brain 99 imaging to show that the modulatory influence on decision signals predicted by the model 100 correlates with BOLD signals the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and interconnected 101 structures, where neural signals have variously been implicated in the context-sensitive encoding 102
of action values 26 , and the expected value of cognitive control 27 . We show how our framework, 103 which is not wholly inconsistent with either account, can bring together diverse views concerning 104 the function of this controversial brain region 28 . 105
106

Results
108
Our adaptive gain model is based on a framework that was previously developed to understand 109 how humans performing perceptual decision-tasks adapt to the context provided by information 110 that is proximal in space and time 23, 29 . Inputs arrive at a population of neurons each 111 characterised by a Gaussian tuning curve centred on its preferred feature value . Each neuron 112 responds to the target stimulus with rate = ( | , ), where ( | , ) denotes the 113 probability density function of the normal distribution with mean and variance 2 . 114 8 115
The estimated output of the neural population is then decoded into a subjective percept of the 116 target ̂ by weighting the population activity by the corresponding feature values . 117
118
(1) 119
When the gain is uniformly spread across the feature space (i.e. the tuning widths for all 120 neurons are equal) this approach faithfully decodes each input to its original feature value. 121 However, our model proposes that the context provided by the distracters modulates the 122 sharpening of neuronal tuning, with a tuning width envelope that matches the inverse distribution 123 of contextual features with mean and standard deviation . (2) 127
In other words, neurons with preferred orientation that matches have the sharpest tuning 128 curves, and these tuning curves are even sharper if the flanker variance ( ) is low (see Fig. 2a ). 129
In equation (2), denotes the maximum tuning width in the population, and is a noise that is made in the context of distracters with average value . We plot the difference in their 148 corresponding subjective estimates ̂+ −̂− as a function of , observing a pattern with a 149 striking qualitative resemblance to that reported previously 10 ( Fig. 1b) . Again, the model's ability 150 to predict this counterintuitive pattern comes from the repulsive effect induced by differential 151 tuning across feature space. The model predicts that as the value of the decoy increases, 152 repulsion is first strongest towards − (leading to a reduced preference for the best option + ) 153 but then, as the decoy approaches the two items in the choice set, repulsion is maximal for + , 154 reversing this effect. In further simulations, we systematically varied both the distance between 155 + and − , and , we were able to capture the two-dimensional pattern of multi-alternative 156 choice data described in a different study involving abstract shapes associated with different 157 economic values 11 (Fig. S2) . 158
Next, we used our model to simulate performance on a new variant of the flanker task that 160 involves categorising a central grating tilted at -45 from vertical, in the face of flanking gratings 161 that are on average tilted in a compatible ( = −45°) or incompatible ( = +45°) fashion. 162 strongest for response times, we plot the inverse model output 1 |̂| ⁄ as a proxy for RT (this is 165 equivalent to assuming a ballistic evidence accumulation process; see equation (1) and methods). 166
As can be seen, the model predicts a compatibility effect: faster RTs for trials where the target and 167 distracters were of congruent sign. However, it also makes a new, testable prediction: that as 168 (flanker variance) decreases, response times should be reduced on compatible trials but remain 169 the same on incompatible trials (Fig. 2c) . This occurs because on compatible trials (flankers at -170 45), more gain is allocated to the target feature when the variance of the distribution of flanker 171 orientations is lower. However, the gain allocated to incongruent targets (flankers at +45) is 172 negligibly different across different flanker variance levels since the neural gain they received are 173 similar at the tail of the gain distribution, and so the model predicts that flanker variance should 174 not affect performance on incongruent trials ( Fig. 2a) . By contrast, classic models propose that 175 response conflict varies with the amount of crosstalk interference among responses 14 . These 176 models predict that heightened flanker variance should have equal impact on compatible and 177 incompatible trials (see Methods for model details). 178
179
We tested this prediction in Exp. 1 by asking healthy human participants to judge, relative to 180 vertical, the tilt of a single target grating surrounded by 6 flanking distracter gratings (Fig. 2b) . The We fit our adaptive gain model to the data, and compared its predictions to those of a model 194
proposing that RT depends on response conflict alone. The fits for the gain model (coloured 195 circles) are shown superimposed upon the human data in Fig. 2c and 2d . We compared the 196 models head-to-head by computing mean-squared error (MSE) in RT across conditions on half of 197 the data (even trials), after estimating parameters from an independent dataset (odd trials). 198
Bayesian model selection showed that the adaptive gain model fit the human data more closely 199 than the conflict model, with exceedance probabilities for the adaptive gain model of 0.95 in Exp. variance (panels). Finally, although the model indicates that RTs will be dominated by the distance 216 between and the category boundary, it predicts that in the specific case where and are 217 both close to vertical, this cost will be strongly attenuated. 218 We tested these predictions using the flanker paradigm on two new cohorts of participants, one of 220 which (Exp. 2a, n = 28) performed the tilt categorisation task described above, except with the full 221 6 (target mean) x 6 (flanker mean) x 3 (flanker variance) design. Another (Exp. 2b, n = 30) 222 performed a task with the same design that involved judging the colour of a central circle (red vs. 223 blue) surrounded by distracting flankers that varied continuously in colour from red to blue. 224
Results from the two experiments were qualitatively very similar (see Fig. S3 , S4 for separate data) 225 and so after normalising the feature values (tilt, colour) to an equivalent scale in the range [-1,1] 226 we collapsed over them for display purposes. All three model predictions were strongly present in 227 the human RT data ( Fig. 3a-c) . Firstly, splitting trials naively into compatible and incompatible, 228 there was no overall significant difference in RT, either in the combined cohort (t57 = 1.14, p = 229 0.26) or separately for each experiment (Exp. 2a: p = 0.79; Exp. 2b: p = 0.17). Secondly, we see a 230 strong cost on congruent trials when the flanker mean is further from the boundary than the 231 target mean, as demonstrated by an × interaction (F3.72,208.23 = 17.48, p < 0.001) that was 232 much weaker on incongruent trials (F3.39,212.25 = 2.47, p = 0.049). This difference was qualified by a 233 reliable three-way | | × | | × interaction on human RTs (F3.54,198.12 = 14.62, p 234 < 0.001). 235
236
The analyses described thus far pertain to RT data. In a final analysis of Exp.2 we examined 237 choices, using a previously-described approach based on probit regression to assess the weight (or 238 influence) that distracters wielded over choices, as a function of whether their tilt was inlying or 239 outlying with respect to category boundary 33, 34 . We attempted to predict choices on each trial as 240 follows: 241
Where is tallied into 8 bins according to its signed feature value (e.g. from most 245 counterclockwise to clockwise, or most red to blue). Plotting the coefficients 2 associated with 246 each bin j for model choices (obtained via the fitting procedure above), the model 247 counterintuitively predicts that inlying flankers (those whose feature value falls close to the 248 category boundary) will have a stronger impact on choices than outlying flankers. This occurs 249 because the context-dependent gain field is, on average over all trials, Gaussian with a mean of 250 approximately zero; in other words, the tuning of neurons near the category boundary is on 251 average sharper. When we applied the same analysis to human data, we observed exactly the 252 same pattern, with inlying flankers exerting a more distracting influence on choices ( Fig. 4a) . 253
Applying the same regression model to predict RTs, the plots of 2 for both humans and the 254 model show the characteristic repulsion effect in choices, that is owing to the greater contextual 255 modulation of neural tuning near the category boundary ( Fig. 4b) . Together, these analyses show 256 that the human data resemble the counterintuitive model predictions over 4 different 257 experimental datasets. 258
Functional brain imaging 262
Established theories propose that a brain network that prominently includes the dorsal anterior 263 cingulate cortex (dACC) is involved in the recruitment of control processes that allow the brain to 264 . 1a) . Higher absolute magnitude of beta weights implies that orientations that are close to the category boundary are more predictive of RT, similar to what was shown on choice in panel A. Shaded areas are the standard error of mean. overcome distraction. Across a range of paradigms including the Eriksen Flanker task, the dACC 265 responds with higher-amplitude BOLD signals on incompatible than compatible trials 35, 36 , and this 266 effect is accentuated when the previous trial was compatible ('conflict adaptation'), as if the dACC 267 is monitoring for conflict and signalling its onset 37 . However, the dACC is also implicated in 268 decision processes more generally. For example, it signals the level of noise that corrupts an 269 imperative stimulus during perceptual discrimination 38 , and its proximity to a choice point or Behavioural results of this experiment replicated those from Exp.2 (Fig. S5) , and so we focussed on 280 neural analysis to test whether brain signals indexed decision information in a way that was 281 predicted by the adaptive gain model. We began by confirming previous reports that the dACC 282 responds more vigorously when a target feature lies closer to a category boundary, i.e. in our 283 experiment, when the target orientation is closer to vertical 39 . We first regressed | | (i.e. 284 proximity of the target to the category boundary) alone against BOLD signals occurring at the time 285 of choice across the entire brain (GLM1). Consistent with previous observations, we observed a 286 negative effect of | | in the dACC (peak: 2, 8, 54, t19 = 9.66, pfdr < 0.001), as well as the anterior 287 insula (AIC; peak: 34,34,2, t19 = 10.11, pfdr < 0.001) and superior parietal lobe (SPL; peak: 18, -68, 288 58, t19 = 8.09, pfdr < 0.001 see Fig. 5a ). Extracting regions of interest from these areas in a leave-289 one-out fashion across participants (see Methods), we then plotted how the BOLD signal varied in 290 quartiles of both and (GLM2) and compared these signals to the predictions of (i) the 291 adaptive gain model, (ii) an equivalent model with no adaptive gain, i.e. where all simulated cells 292 had equivalent tuning width, and (iii) a model in which BOLD signals were driven by conflict alone 293 ( Fig. 5b) . We found that the pattern of BOLD signals in all 3 regions closely resembled that 294 predicted by the adaptive gain model, but not the other models (Fig. 5c) . Specifically, although 295 BOLD responses were elevated when the was close to zero (dACC: F1,19 = 52.37, p < 0.001; AIC: 296 F1,19 = 53.4, p < 0.001; SPL: F1,19 = 48.94, p < 0.001), this effect was exaggerated on those trials 297 where was far from zero but of compatible sign (i.e. greater BOLD response in dACC, AIC and 298 SPL on congruent relative to incongruent trials; dACC: t19 = 3.03, p = 0.0069; AIC: t19 = 2.82, p = 299 0.011; SPL: t19 = 2.28, p = 0.034). No such modulation was observed when was far from zero, as 300 predicted by the adaptive gain model. This suggests that a gain-modulated decision variable, rather than a conflict signal per se, is driving 304 the dACC response. However, to quantify and compare the predictions of different models, we 305 used Bayesian neural model comparison 49 . We fit the adaptive gain model and the rival conflict 306 Fig. 6a ). In other words, the dACC, along with 316 AIC and SPL, code for a decision signal modulated in precisely the fashion predicted by the 317 adaptive gain model. 318
Finally, we addressed a concern that dACC is simply exhibiting a BOLD signal that correlates with 321 the response production time on each trial 51 . Disentangling these factors is challenging, because 322 (as described above) the model does an excellent job of predicting RTs. Nevertheless, when we 323 included both model output 1 |̂| ⁄ and RTs as competitive predictors in the model (GLM4), we 324 still recovered a significant activation in the dACC (peak: 2, 20, 50, t19 = 5.28,pfdr = 0.023), and AIC 325 (left peak: -30, 20, 6, t19 = 6.09 , pfdr < 0.001; right peak: 34, 24, -6, t19 = 5.94, pfdr < 0.001). In other 326 The model is thus in clear accord with a large literature indicating that dACC BOLD increases when 334 target and distracters are incongruent in a simple version of the Flanker task 54 . We note that as 335 described here, the adaptive gain model computes decision values independently on each 336 successive trial, and thus in its current form would not predict conflict adaptation in the dACC. 337
However, one could reasonably assume that adaptive effects may spill over from one trial to the 338 next, i.e. that neural tuning width will be partly modulated by the previous trial. Under this 339 assumption, the adaptive gain model will successfully predict that responses should be faster on 340 two successive incongruent or two successive congruent trials 55 , just as it successfully account for 341 the observation that during categorisation of a multi-element array, response times are faster if 342 the target array is preceded by a prime array with an equivalent level of feature variance 29 . 343 344 However, we also note another facet of our results: that BOLD signals in the dACC, AIC and SPL 345
ROIs correlate negatively with | | but positively with | | (GLM5; Fig. 6b ; dACC: t19 = 2.27, p = 346 0.035, AIC: t19 = 3.03, p = 0.003, SPL: t19 = 4.56, p = 0.007; this effect was also significant at the 347 whole-brain level in voxels within the AIC and SPL, but not dACC). If we consider the target to be a 348 "chosen" option and the flankers as a competing, "unchosen" option, the ensemble of findings 349 reported here is reminiscent of the well-described finding by which dACC signals scale positively 350 with the decision value associated with an unchosen option (i.e. the flankers) and negatively with 351 the value of a chosen option (i.e. the target). Building on this intuition, we tested more directly the 352 coding of model-predicted value of a chosen and unchosen option in a further simulation in which 353 decision values for two stimuli were drawn randomly and independently from two distributions, 354 and model output was converted to a choice via a softmax function (see Methods). This allowed 355 us to correlate model output (i.e. predicted BOLD) with the value of the chosen and unchosen 356 option, revealing a negative correlation with the former and a positive correlation with the latter, 357 as previously reported 56 (Fig. 6c) Good choices are based solely on information that is relevant to the choice at hand, and rational 365 agents will successfully ignore distracting signals when making decisions 1 . However, across 366 perceptual, cognitive and economic domains, human participants are observed to deviate from 367 this rational principle. A range of different theories have been proposed to account for human 368 susceptibility to distraction, but thus far, no single model has emerged that can account for 369 phenomena as diverse as visual illusions, susceptibility to conflicting contextual features, or 370 economic decoy effects. Here, we describe one such account. Our adaptive gain model has 371
previously been shown to successfully account for diverse contextual influences in perceptual 372 decision-making, including confirmatory biases in sequential sampling 23 and priming by second-373 order summary statistics in perceptual categorisation 29 . Here, we show that not only can it 374 account for classical effects of distraction across perceptual, cognitive and economic domains, but 375 also that it successfully predicts a range of previously unreported, counterintuitive findings in a 376 well-studied cognitive paradigm, the Eriksen flanker task 8 . 377
378
The effect of distraction is most often modelled under the assumption that irrelevant features are 379 imperfectly filtered during decision-making, driving residual activation that corrupts decisions. 380
When target and distracters prompt conflicting sensorimotor responses, the resulting competition 381 slows response times and increases error rates 14 . A very successful neurocognitive theory 382
proposes that dedicated processing systems have evolved in the primate medial prefrontal cortex 383 that detect this conflict, and that are responsible for mobilising control mechanisms (associated 384 with the lateral prefrontal cortex) to help mitigate the resulting costs 57 . Here, we propose a 385 differing view: one that emphasises the benefits of consistent context rather than the costs of 386 inconsistent context. In the adaptive gain model, contextual features offer guidance as to where 387 to best allocate gain across feature space, ensuring that neurons that code for the most prevalent 388 (or "expected") features have the sharpest tuning and thus provide the most sensitive outputs. 389
The adaptive gain model is thus motivated by the more general view that the nervous system has 390 evolved to code for efficiently for sensory inputs, reducing redundancy by dynamically adjusting 391 the tuning properties of decision-relevant neurons to maximise sensitivity to expected 392 features 24,58 . In the flanker task, thus, the difference between compatible and incompatible trials 393 arises at least in part because of a contextual facilitation mechanism at the decision level, akin to 394 that described in sensory circuits 59 , rather than because of an active cost of response competition. 395
This idea is not without precedent in theories of control. In fact, the notion that a flexible response 396 to stimulus conflict is dependent on adaptive expectation mechanisms dates back to the original 397 discovery of conflict adaptation by Gratton and colleagues more than 25 years ago 55 . 398
399
We take the opportunity to highlight two major features of our behavioural data that cannot be 400 accounted for by standard accounts that emphasise the cost of conflict alone. Firstly, in Exp.1a-b, 401
we found that a low-variance flanker array hastens response times on congruent trials, rather than 402 prolonging response times on incongruent trials. This is consistent with an account that 403 emphasises the benefit of consistent context rather than the cost of inconsistent context. 404
Secondly, in Exp.2a-b, we observed that the longest response times were in fact observed on 405 compatible trials, not incompatible trials. We replicated this finding across two different classes of 406 visual feature: tilt and colour. According to our model, this cost occurred when the gain field 407 dictated by the context repulsed the target subjectively closer to the category boundary, 408 rendering choices more uncertain. Although such negative flanker effects have been reported 409 with heavily masked stimuli, where they can be explained by differing timecourses of facilitatory 410 versus inhibitory processes 60 , only rarely have such phenomena been reported for fully visible 411 targets and distracters such as ours. Most interestingly, one such report occurred for a modified 412 version of the flanker task where the targets were letters that were parametrically morphed 413 between two possible identities, each corresponding to a possible flanker 61 . This report describes 414 negative flanker effects when the target is most ambiguous, precisely parallelling our findings here 415 for trials with small and large m , and a shift in the psychometric function that occurs with 416 flanker identity in precisely the fashion predicted by our adaptive gain model 23 . 417
418
Our behavioural findings were echoed in the neural data recorded from dACC, where BOLD signals 419 were higher when targets fell closer to the category boundary, but these signals were positively 420 modulated (yet higher) when the distracters mean was congruent but further from the boundary. 421
Without further assumptions, a model based on conflict alone cannot account for these findings. 422
We do not wish to argue that stimulus or response conflict do not ever incur an additional cost to 423 accuracy and response times, or that such a cost is unable to drive the dACC. Nevertheless, in the 424 current study, we found that such an account was not required to explain our data, and that a 425 model embodying this assumption fit our data more poorly. 426
427
Our findings present a challenge to extant theories, but we acknowledge that our model is 428 currently incomplete. A large literature implicates the dACC in the mechanisms by which we 429 update the value of actions in dynamically changing environments 45, 62 . Our experiments were 430 conducted in stationary settings, and we do not doubt that these regions may play additional roles 431 (potentially also related to gain control) when slower learning about a changing context is 432 required. We also note an important shortcoming in our findings: we were unable to identify 433 differing roles for the dACC, AIC and SPL, which seem to act as one in our study. We think it is 434 likely that our BOLD data are simply indexing the output of a decision process that involves 435 modulation by distracting context, but are unable to make strong claims about the interim 436 processes by which the computations proposed by the model occur. We suspect that exploring 437 the role of adaptive gain control in dynamically-changing environments may shed more light on 438 the differing contributions made by these regions, and we hope to pursue this question in future 439 studies. 440 441
Methods
28
For behavioural studies Exp.1 and 2, human participants were recruited via the online testing 444 platform provided by Amazon Mechanical Turk (Exp. 1a: n = 37, 19 men, mean age: 31.8 years, SD 445 = 8.09; Exp.1b: n = 36, 22 men, mean age: 31.12 years, SD = 9.57; Exp. 2a: n = 28, 14 men, mean 446 age: 33.5 years, SD = 13.09; Exp.2b: n = 30, 16 men, mean age: 33.3 years, SD = 9.5). Mind here 447 that the age information was collected by sets of age (e.g. 18-20, 21-30, 31-40 etc.) due to online 448 testing, thus the reported age from Exp. 1a,1b,2a,2b was computed by taking the bin center of 449 each age bin as the approximation of participants' true age. 489 Experiment 3 (fMRI study). All stimuli were presented on a grey background. Participants first saw 490 a fixation dot for 500ms, followed by the presentation of stimuli for 500ms, and were asked to 491 respond within 1500 ms of stimulus onset. Stimuli were tilted gratings as for Exp.1 and Exp.2a. At 492 the end of response window, visual feedback in the form of a green or red dot indicated whether 493 the response was correct or not. There was a jittered interval of between 2-6s (on average 4s) 494 interposed between trials. Target tilt and flanker tilt statistics were varied independently on a 495 trial-by-trial basis. On each trial, tilts of the target grating and flanker mean orientation were 496 drawn independently from uniform distributions with a limit of -45° and +45°. Similarly, flanker 497 standard deviation could be values between 0 to 30° from a uniform distribution. Resampling was 498 used to ensure that the number of congruent and incongruent trials was matched across the 499 entire experiment. Participants completed 4 (n = 10) or 5 (n = 10) blocks of the task in the scanner, 500 with 130 trials on each block. 501 502 fMRI acquisition and preprocessing. Images were acquired with 3-Tesla Siemens TrioTim with a 503 32-channel head coil using a standard echo-planar imaging sequence. Images were 64 × 64 ×32 504 volumes with voxel size 3.5×3.5×3.5 mm; acquired with a 2s repetition time and echo time of 30 505 ms. We acquired fMRI data in 4 or 5 runs with 425 volumes per run. All preprocessing and fMRI 506 analyses were carried out using SPM12. Preprocessing of the imaging data includes realignment of 507 function images, co-registration of anatomical scan to the mean functional image, followed by 508 segmentation and spatial normalisation to the standard template brain of the Montreal 509
Neurological Institute (MNI brain). Lastly function images were spatially smooth with a 6-mm full 510 width half maximum Gaussian kernel. A 128-s temporal high-pass filter was applied to exclude 511 low-frequency artefacts. 512 513
Design and behavioural analysis 514
For experiments 1 and 2, the design orthogonalised the manipulation of target feature value ( ), 515 mean of flankers ( ) and variability of flankers ( ). We can further designate trials as 516 "congruent" when has the same sign as or "incongruent" when has the opposite sign as 517
. In Experiment 1, we thus have a 3 × 2 (flanker variability × congruency) within-participant 518 factorial design. In experiment 2, we introduced three levels of | | and three levels of | |, 519 resulting in 3 × 3 × 3 × 2 (| |× | | × × congruency) within-participant factorial design with 520 54 conditions. Full list of , | | , and levels were displayed in Table S1 . For Exp. 1 and 2, 521 ANOVAS with Greenhouse-Geisser correction for sphericity were carried out at group-level 522 analyses. A threshold of p < 0.05 was adopted for all behavioural analyses. We only analysed RT 523 from correct trials, and additionally excluded trials where RT was faster than the 1% percentile or 524 slower than the 99% percentile of the RT distribution. We used the same exclusion criteria across 525 experiments. This calculation of RT is equivalent to modelling the data with ballistic (noiseless) diffusion 538 process, with the two additional parameters 0 and 1 encoding the drift rate and non-decision 539 time respectively (fixed across conditions). Searching , exhaustively across values of and 540 from equation (2), we identified the parameters that minimised mean squared error (MSE) 541
between the human and model-predicted average RTs for each condition. 
Simulations of qualitative effects 577
When fit to human data, the adaptive gain model contained 2 free parameters: maximum tuning 578 width ( ) and sensory noise ( ). Simulations of the model aimed at qualitatively recreating 579 effects from the past literature (e.g. for Fig.1, Fig. 6 ) assumed a fixed ( = 10) and a 580 fixed ( = 5) unless noted otherwise. 581 Tilt illusion. In this simulation, we plot the difference between the true target angle (here, zero) 583 and the gain modulated decision value (̂) as a function of flanker mean decision value ( ∈ 584 {−45, −44, … , +45° }) and flanker standard deviation ( ∈ {3,7,11,15}). For each variant of 585 flanker mean decision values and flanker standard deviation, ̂ is computed using equation (1) 586 and 2. We then plot ̂ against levels of flanker mean decision value and flanker standard 587 deviation in Fig. 1a . 588 589 Conflict effects. We computed a proxy of RT (1/̂) for the 3 conditions: 'CO': Congruent, where 590 the target shares the same response association with the flankers; 'SI': Stimulus Incongruent, 591 where the target is perceptually different to the flankers but the response associations of the two 592 are still the same; 'RI': Response Incongruent, where the target has a different response 593 association as the flankers (Fig. 1b) . In the simulation, flanker standard deviation is set to be 0 594 in both 'CO' and 'RI' condition (i.e. we assumed flanker standard deviation was , or 5). In 'CO', 595 is equal to (both are +45°). In 'RI', has the opposite sign to the . Lastly, we simulated 596 'SI' condition by assuming is higher than 0 i.e. = 5; individual flankers are variable but 597 remained the same as . We assumed a higher maximum tuning width ( = 15) in this 598 simulation. 599 600 Multi-alternative valued-based decision making task. In Fig. 1c , we simulated the difference 601 between the model estimated decision values from the two targets ( + = 20 & − = 10 ) as a 602 function of a third distractors' orientation ( ∈ {−45, −44, … , +45°}).
was assumed to be 5 603 in this simulation. In Fig. S1 , we computed the model output associated with the highest-valued 604 choice-relevant alternative ( + ) and the next best alternative ( − ), assuming that the mode of 605 the gain field determined by the statistics lowest-valued (i.e. irrelevant) alternative . We then 606 35 plotted a quantity proportional to choice probability, + − − , i.e. the relative difference in 607 model output for the best and next best options. 608 609 Value of chosen vs. unchosen option. We simulated the model output as a function of the value of 610 a theoretical chosen and unchosen option. On each trial, decision values for two stimuli ( 1 and 611 2 ) were drawn independently from two zero-mean Gaussian distribution with a standard 612 deviation of 10. On every trial, we allowed simultaneous evaluation of each stimulus in the context 613 of the other, i.e. we passed each stimulus through the model as target with the alternative as 614 distracter. We then assumed that participants chose according to the relative subjective (i.e. 
